Manley and Wasserman raise a number of criticisms of the conditional

analyses of dispositions currently on offer – most notably, the simple

conditional analysis – such as those featuring what they call

Achilles’ heel and its reverse cousin. Their criticisms, thought to

bring up interesting aspects of dispositions that haven’t received due

attention in the literature, are ever since embraced by many leading

scholars, who are further led to the conclusion that there is no hope

for the simple conditional analysis. But I will argue below that this

conclusion is immature, for Manley and Wasserman’s criticisms can be

fended off by viewing the simple conditional analysis as an analysis

of canonical dispositions and supplementing it with an improved way of

cashing out conventionals dispositions in terms of canonical

dispositions. This upshot is hoped to clean up the tanrished

reputation of the simple conditional analysis despite the adverse

pressure from the apparently widespread consensus among philosophers

of dispositions.